ESSBridgeExt JA Redacted

CUI
Control Number: FY27-1009
4. Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition 10 U.S.C. 3204(a)(1), as implemented by RFO 6.103-1, Only One Responsible Source. 5. Rationale Justifying Use of Authority Cited
Only one responsible source can perform this requirement within the required timeframe. ASC currently operates the accredited, running ESS test environment, and no other source can assume that operation on day one without a break in service.
There is no other place to do the work during the bridge period. The accredited environment sits in space the incumbent holds under lease. That lease has been renewed for a six-year term cannot be assigned, and the incumbent does not intend to sublease. No other source has an approved facility from which to run this environment during the bridge and standing up and accrediting a replacement facility takes substantially longer than the bridge period.
Additionally, a new operator must earn its own authorization before it may lawfully operate the environment. The environment holds a Zone-B Authorization to Operate on TI.MIL under seven Risk Management Framework packages in eMASS. Market research estimates for a nonincumbent to reach full operational status, including facility standup and accreditation, ranged from six to nine months or longer.
This is not a proprietary barrier. The Government owns the hardware, software, and custom automation, and no other party holds intellectual property that would prevent a successor from performing. The constraint is facility availability and time. A break in service would stop mission work immediately. The environment is not idle between test events; it hosts the SDLCNext system of record and the Jira and Confluence tooling that MHS GENESIS engineering and product management use daily. A break would halt testing, engineering, product management, and associated tooling, and delay fielding of new capabilities, primarily JOMIS and potentially DHMSM. Stopping testing would force a choice between two unacceptable outcomes: fielding without adequate testing, which risks defects reaching production and undermines user trust and patient safety, or holding deployments for lack of testing and accepting resulting schedule and readiness risk. Testing during this period is continuous and not tied to a single named event. The bridge period supports ongoing developmental and integration testing across the JOMIS release pipeline, and to a lesser extent DHMSM. Because testing is continuous, no break interval avoids the harm